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Abstract: This note discusses the possible existence of a domestic surveillance/data
collection program conducted by the National Security Agency ("NSA") with the
assistance of AT&T, and the implications of such a program under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"). This article first examines a May 11, 2006
USA Today article reporting that the NSA was given access to a huge number of call
records from AT&T. Next, it turns to the story of former AT&T technician Mark
Klein and the Electronic Frontier Foundation's ("EFF") case, Hepting v. AT&T
Corporation. Klein claims that the NSA has built a "secret room" in AT&T's San
Francisco switching center that grants the agency access to a vast amount of
customer information. In Hepting, the EFF alleges that AT&T violated the Stored
Communications Act, Title II of the ECPA; the Wiretap Act, Title I of the ECPA;
and the Pen Register Statute, Title III of the ECPA. Finally, this article addresses the
Protect America Act of 2007 and provides analysis of expert opinions in the field.
* Author is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (expected
2008).
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I. INTRODUCTION: MAY 11, 2006
On May 11, 2006, USA Today published an article reporting that
AT&T, Verizon, and Bellsouth had been providing the NSA with the
telephone records of "tens of millions of Americans" since shortly
after September 11, 2001.1 Called "the largest database ever
assembled in the world" by the newspaper's source, its purported goal
was to "'create a database of every call ever made' within the nation's
borders."2
Supposedly, this program did not listen to or record conversations.
Instead, it collected customer "call-detail records" ("CDRs") from the
telecommunication companies ("telecos"). 3 Ordinarily, CDRs contain
information such as the parties to a call, duration, and billing period,
not records of conversations.4 According to USA Today's source, the
CDRs received by the NSA through this program contained only
telephone numbers: names, addresses, and other personal information
were not included.
Although it was not implicated in the story, Qwest, a teleco that
operates primarily in the West and Northwest, quickly stated that it
had not participated in the NSA program.6  Shortly thereafter, both
1 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans'Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May
11, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsax.htm.
2id.
31d.
4 Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, FAQ: NSA 's Data Mining Explained, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 12, 2006, http://news.com.com/FAQ+NSAs+data+mining+explained/2 100-
1028_3-6071780.html?tag=st.prev. See also Call Detail Records (CDR),
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/iosl20/120newft/120t/12t2/cdrfn
.htm#wp8482 (last visited Jan. 23, 2008); What is a Call Detail Record?,
http://searchvoip.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid66_gci1032982,00.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2008). For an example of the information collected in CDRs, see Call Data Records,
http://www.csoft.co.uk/reports/cdrl.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
5 Cauley, supra note 1. It should be noted that the NSA may still be receiving conversation
records from another source. In August 1999, the agency patented a system for extracting data
from computer-generated text such as a call records. See McCullagh & Broache, supra note 4.
6 Cauley, supra note 1 ("Qwest provides local phone service to 14 million customers in 14
states in the West and Northwest."). Since AT&T and Verizon provide some services to
people in Qwest's region, the NSA may have obtained CDRs this area. Id.
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BellSouth and Verizon also denied involvement. 7  BellSouth
demanded that USA Today state for the record that it had not been
involved with the NSA.8 Eventually, on June 30, 2006, USA Today
withdrew the story as it applied to Verizon and BellSouth. 9 At the
same time, however, the newspaper reaffirmed the existence of some
domestic data-collection program, even if BellSouth and Verizon were
not associated with the program. USA Today reported that
Congressional Intelligence Committee members had confirmed the
existence of an NSA data-collection program and that AT&T was
involved. 10 Unlike BellSouth and Verizon, AT&T neither confirmed
nor denied assisting the NSA, asserting that the U.S. Department of
Justice said discussing the program would harm national security.l'
President Bush acknowledged the NSA program shortly after the
story broke. In a statement similar to one he made in December
2005,12 the President said he had authorized the NSA to "intercept
international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda
and related terrorist organizations."' 13  The President made three
important points: first, the program specifically targeted members of
al Qaeda and was not random data-collection; second, it did not
involve listening to domestic calls without court approval; and third, it
was legal and that members of Congress knew about the program.
According to President Bush, the government was "not mining or
7 BellSouth Denies Giving Records to NSA, May 15, 2006, CNN.coM, http://www.cnn.com/
2006/POLITICS/05/15/bellsouth.nsa. See also Jim Drinkard, Verizon Says it Isn't Giving Call
Records to NSA, USA TODAY, May 16, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2006-05-16-verizon-nsax.htm.
8 Jim Drinkard, BellSouth Calls for a Retraction of Report it Cooperated with NSA, USA
TODAY, May 18, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-18-bellsouth-
nsa x.htm.
9 Susan Page, Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-30-nsax.htm.
0 Id. ("Five members of the intelligence committees said they were told by senior intelligence
officials that AT&T participated in the NSA domestic calls program.").
11 Id.
12 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President (Dec. 19,
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html.
13 Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses NSA Surveillance
Program (May 11, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/05/20060511-1 .html.
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trolling through the personal lives of millions of innocent
Americans.' 4
Soon after the President's statement, Massachusetts Representative
Ed Markey asked the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
to address and investigate the claims against the NSA program.
Initially, FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps called for an inquiry
into whether the NSA program violated § 222 of the Communications
Act, 16  which prohibits telephone companies from divulging
information concerning customer calling habits. The FCC "can levy
fines of up to $130,000 per day, per violation, with a cap of $1.325
million per violation" of this law.
After briefly considering the matter, the FCC halted its inquiry.
The agency decided it could not explore the issue further because the
United States government had invoked the state secrets privilege in the
related case, Hepting v. AT&T.18  Fearing that it might breach the
privilege, the FCC chose not to investigate further.'
9
II. MARK KLEIN AND HEPTING v. AT&T
The USA Today article was not the first NSA/AT&T data-
collection story of 2006; when it broke, Mark Klein's story about
secret room 641A was already public and Hepting v. AT&T was being
litigated.
14 id.
15 Letter from Representative Edward Markey, Seventh District of Georgia, to Kevin Martin,
Chairman of the FCC (May 15, 2006), available at
http://markey.house.gov/docs/telecomm/isstelecom_tr060515.pdf.
16 Press Release, FCC, Comm'r Michael J. Copps Calls for the FCC to Open an Inquiry into
the Lawfulness of the Disclosure of America's Phone Records (May 15, 2006), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/ attachmatch/DOC-265373Al.pdf.
17 Cauley, supra note 1.
1s Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
19 Letter from Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC, to Representative Edward Markey, Seventh
District of Georgia (May 22, 2006), available at
http://markey.house.gov/docs/privacy/isstelecomresp060522.pdf. The state secrets doctrine
is discussed infra in footnotes 164-83 and accompanying text.
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In April 2 0 0 6, Wired News reported that AT&T had built a "secret
room" ("641 A") in its San Francisco switching center that gave the
NSA direct access to the phone calls and internet usage records of its
customers.2 1 Mark Klein, a former AT&T technician, witnessed 641A
being built adjacent to the call routing room when he toured the
switching center in January 2003.22 However, he was unable to see
inside; the NSA conducted interviews before granting access to work
in Room 641 A and regular technicians were not allowed to enter.
23
In October 2003, Klein was transferred to AT&T's San Francisco
office. At his new position, he learned more about 641A, including
the facts that fiber optic cables from 641A tapped directly into the
AT&T WorldNet circuits and that a Narus STA 6400 had been
installed on the line.24  The STA 6400 analyzes calls in real-time,
connecting directly to the phone line or Internet Service Provider
("ISP"), and is commonly used by government intelligence agencies
because of its ability to sort though vast amounts of data.25 Klein also
20 Mark Klein, AT&T's IMPLEMENTATION OF NSA SPYING ON AMERICAN CITIZENS, 3 (Dec. 31,
2005), available at http://blog.wired.com/27BStroke6/attklein-wired.pdf.
21 Ryan Singel, Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room, WIRED NEWS, April 7, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70619. A switching center is "a
facility in which switches are used to interconnect communications circuits on a circuit-,
message-, or packet-switching basis." Federal Standard 1037C: Glossary of
Telecommunications Terms, http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037 (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
22 id.
23 id.
24 Id. WorldNet is AT&T's Internet Service Program.
25 Id. See also Naruslnsight Intercept Suite, http://www.narus.com/products/intercept.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2008). Based in Mountain View, California, Narus calls itself "the leader
in providing the real-time traffic insight essential to profitably manage, secure and deliver
Services over IP." About Narus, http://www.narus.com/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2008). The STA (Semantic Traffic Analyzer) 6400 is a computer program that has the ability
to inspect communications traffic in real-time. A communication company can install an
analyzer at the entrance and exit points of their networks which then communicate with
specialized computer programs. Together, the STA 6400 "can keep track of, analyze and
record nearly every form of intemet communication, whether email, instant message, video
streams or VOIP phone calls that cross the network." Robert Poe, The Ultimate Net
Monitoring Tool, WIRED NEWS, May 17, 2006, http://www.wired.com/science/
discoveries/news/2006/05/70914.
WOLFSON2007-08]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
learned that similar splitter systems were being installed in other cities
26such as Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles, and San Diego.
Shortly before his story went public, Klein submitted a declaration
in support of Hepting v. AT&T, the class action suit filed by the EFF
on behalf of several AT&T customers. The plaintiffs claimed that
AT&T had violated federal electronic surveillance laws by cooperating
with the NSA.27
Hepting arose as a result of December 2005 reports alleging that
President Bush authorized the NSA to conduct warrantless
surveillance inside the United States.28 The New York Times wrote
that the president issued an order in 2002 permitting the National
Security Agency to monitor international phone calls and email
messages without court approval. 29  Historically, the NSA's central
mission consisted of the collection of foreign signals intelligence
("SIGINT"),3 ° not conducting domestic surveillance.3 1 However, the
president said that he only "authorized the interception of international
communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related
terrorist organizations. '" Similarly, Attorney General ("AG") Alberto
Gonzales stated that the program was specifically targeted at
communications where one party was outside the United States.
33
According to The New York Times, at the time of the president's and
26 Poe, supra note 25. For a visual depiction of the NSA data monitoring facilities, see The
NSA Surveillance Octopus, http://www.nsawatch.org/nsaoctopus.jpg (last visited Jan. 23,
2008).
27 Complaint, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/att-complaint.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].
28 Id. at 2. See also James Risen & Eric Lichtenblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/Politics/I 6program.html?ei=5090&en=e32072d786623a
cl&ex=1292389200.
29 id.
30 National Security Agency, Signals Intelligence, http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.cfin (last
visited Jan. 23, 2008).
31 Risen & Lichtenblau, supra note 28.
32 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President, supra note 12.
33Press Release, Att'y Gen. Alberto Gonzales, Press Briefing by Att'y Gen. Alberto Gonzales
and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat'l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-I .html.
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the AG's statements, the NSA still obtained warrants for entirely
domestic communications.
34
Following The New York Times story and the subsequent
qualified admissions by the president and the attorney general, the EFF
filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California.35 The EFF alleged that AT&T improperly granted the
NSA access to at least two enormous call record databases thereby
violating several federal laws including the ECPA.36  The
"Hawkeye," 37 one of the databases the NSA was given access to,
contains up to 312 terabytes of information.38 Accordingly, the EFF
alleged AT&T had improperly given this incredible amount of account
information to the government without the consent or knowledge of its
customers.
In total, the EFF made seven claims against AT&T.39 The most
important claims include allegations that AT&T violated the Stored
Communications Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
and the Pen Register Statute. 
40
III. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
One claim made in Hepting alleged that AT&T violated the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA") by giving both CDRs and
34 Risen & Lichtenblau, supra note 28.
35 Complaint, supra note 27.
31 Id. at 8-9
3' AT&T, Daytona, http://www.research.att.com/-daytona/inuse.php (last visited Jan. 23,
2008).
38 One terabyte = 1,048,576 megabytes or 1,024 gigabytes. Terabyte Computers, What is a
"Terabyte" Anyway?, http://www.terabyte.net/terabyte.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
39 Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 2, Hepting v.
AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-JCS), available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/att_complaint-amended.pdf [hereinafter Amended
Complaint]. The total list of claims that the EFF made is: (1) A violation of the First and
Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2) Electronic surveillance in violation of 50
U.S.C. § 1809; (3) A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511; (4) Use of communications in violations
of 47 U.S.C. § 605; (5) Divulging communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1)
and/or (a)(2); (6) Divulging communications records in violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3);
and (7) Deceptive business practices. Id.
40 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(2), 2702(a)(3).
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communication content records to the NSA. 41 The SCA was enacted
in 1986 as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
42
and provides "protections for wire and electronic communications
retained in computer storage facilities. '' 43 As its name suggests, the
SCA pertains to stored (meaning not in-transit/real-time) electronic
communications, including CDRs.44 Both the NSA and AT&T could
be liable under this Act because the SCA applies to both government
and private parties.45
Sections 2702 and 2703 are "the heart of the SCA. ' ' 6  Section
2702 details when a service provider can and cannot voluntarily
disclose stored communications records.47 Generally, this section
prohibits telecommunications service providers from giving stored call
records to "any governmental entity.'A8 However, there are several
exceptions, such as: when the information is going to its "addressee or
intended recipient"49; when consent has been given5 0 ; and when the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children requires the
information. 51 Notably, the statute provides an exception "to a law
enforcement agency (A) if the contents - (i) were inadvertently
41 Amended Complaint, supra note 39, at 23.
42 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
43 Michael D. Roundy, Note, Reconcilable Differences: A Framework for Determining the
"Interception" of Electronic Communications Following United States v. Councilman's
Rejection of the Storage/Transit Dichotomy, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 403, 413 (2006). See
also A Thinly Veiled Request for Congressional Action on E-Mail Privacy: United States v.
Councilman, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 211, 214 (2005).
44 Daniel J. Solove, Reshaping the Framework: Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1264, 1283 (2004).
45 Myrna L. Wigod, Privacy in Public and Private E-Mail and On-Line Systems, 19 PACE L.
REV. 95, 113 (1998).
46 Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1218 (2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=421860.
471d. at 1220.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (Supp. V 2005).
49 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2000).
'0 § 2702(b)(3).
" § 2702(b)(6).
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obtained by the service provider" and "(ii) appear to pertain to the
commission of a crime" 52; or "to a governmental entity, if the
provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of
death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure
without delay of communications relating to the emergency.
Under § 2703, a telephone service provider may be required to
turn over call records under certain circumstances. To compel
disclosure of content records that are less than 180 days old, the
government must obtain a search warrant. 54  For records older than
180 days, the government can obtain a search warrant,55 use an
"administrative subpoena, ' 56 or obtain a court order pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d).57 Notice is required for the latter two methods.58
For non-content records such as CDRs,59 § 2703 provides five
ways that the government can require an electronic communications
service provider to disclose this information: (1) by obtaining a
warrant; (2) by obtaining a court order; (3) by obtaining customer
consent; (4) by a formal government request for a telemarketing fraud
investigation; and (5) by using an administrative subpoena. 60
52 § 2702(b)(7).
5 § 2702(b)(8).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. V 2005).
" § 2703(b)(1)(A).
56 § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). "Administrative subpoena authority.., is the power vested in various
administrative agencies to compel testimony or the production of documents or both in aid of
the agencies' performance of their duties." CHARLES DOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN CRIMINAL AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS:
BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS, 1 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32880.pdf.
"7 § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii). The court order required is found in § 2703(d) and is "something like a
mix between a subpoena and a search warrant." Kerr, supra note 46, at 1219.
58 § 2703(b)(1)(B).
59 "These records are sometimes known as 'basic subscriber information' because they mostly
involve information about the subscriber's identity." Generally, this information includes:
name, address, session times and durations, and length of service. Kerr, supra note 46, at
1219.
60 Peter Swire & Judd Legum, Telecos Could be Liable for Tens of Billions of Dollars for
Illegally Turning Over Phone Records, http://thinkprogress.org/2006/05/11 /telcos-liable (last
visited Jan. 23, 2008). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(E) (Supp. V 2005).
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The first four exceptions clearly do not apply in the NSA/AT&T
situation. No warrants or court orders were obtained, the program was
conducted in secrecy without consulting customers, and the
government is not investigating telemarketing fraud. "As for
administrative subpoenas, where a government agency asks for records
without court approval, there is a simple answer-the NSA has no
administrative subpoena authority, and it is the NSA that reportedly
received the phone records." 61
The SCA draws two significant distinctions in §§ 2702 and 2703.
First, because CDRs generally contain less private information, they
are less protected and require less strenuous efforts to obtain than
content records.62 Second, the SCA applies to stored communications
and not to communications as they occur.6 3  Real-time/in-transit
communications are protected by other sections of the ECPA: the
Wiretap Act 64 and the Pen Register Statute. 65 Nevertheless, "[b]ecause
the Wiretap Act requires the government to obtain a 'super' search
warrant rather than the usual warrant required by the SCA, law
enforcement agents have an incentive to try to do prospective
surveillance normally undertaken under the Wiretap Act using the
retrospective authority of the SCA.",6
6
Section 2707 provides a cause of action to any electronic
communication service provider, subscriber or other person who is
"aggrieved" by a violation of the SCA.67 Relief may include
preliminary or "other equitable or declaratory relief as may be
appropriate," damages, and even attorney's fees and litigation costs.
6 8
Moreover, "the court may assess as damages ... the actual damages
suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator.., but in
no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of
61 See id.
62 Solove, supra note 44, at 1283.
63 id.
64 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
65 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
66 Kerr, supra note 46, at 1232. The Wiretap Act is discussed infra in footnotes 71-114 and
accompanying text.
67 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (Supp. V 2005). See also Swire & Legum, supra note 60.
61 § 2707(b)(1)-(3).
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$1,000.,,69 Accordingly, with potentially millions of CDRs given to
the NSA, the penalties against AT&T or any other teleco that
participated in the data-collection program could range in the billions
of dollars.70
IV. THE HISTORY AND ADVENT OF THE
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
The roots of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
lie in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In the
early days of the country, the Supreme Court did not use the Fourth
Amendment to protect an individual's privacy rights. 7' Then, in 1886
the Court suggested in Boyd v. United States that the Fourth
Amendment might extend beyond physical invasions of property.
72
However, nearly forty years after Boyd, the Court refused to extend the
protections of the Amendment in Olmstead v. United States.
73
Olmstead held that there must be a physical trespass to run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment 74; tapping a person's telephone from outside the
house was not an unreasonable search and seizure.
75
Around the time of Olmstead, Congress was more willing than the
Supreme Court to offer protections against wiretapping. In 1934, the
Legislature passed the Federal Communications Act ("FCA") that
69 § 2707(c).
70 Swire & Legum, supra note 60.
71 Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment's Public/Private
Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1198 (1985).
72 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
73 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,464 (1928); see also Morgan Cloud, Rube
Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 72 MIss. L.J. 5, 15 (2002). "The Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. United
States sounded the death knell for the Fourth Amendment theories that integrated property law
with an expansive interpretation of constitutional provisions designed to protect individual
liberty." Id. at 15.
7" Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
7' DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE, 197 (NYU Press 2004).
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provided federal statutory protection against the electronic surveillance
of private conversations.7
6
Following the FCA, the Supreme Court grew more willing to
protect electronic privacy then it was in Olmstead. First, in Nardone v.
United States, the Court held that the FCA prohibited using evidence
obtained by illegal wiretaps in federal courts. 7 7 Then, in Berger v.
New York, the Court held that electronic surveillance was only
permissible under a narrow set of circumstances.78 Finally, the Court
explicitly overruled Olmstead when it decided Katz v. United States in
1967. 79 There it held that the Fourth Amendment protects people
where there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" regardless of
physical intrusion.80
After these developments, "wiretap surveillance was (ostensibly
prohibited under federal law," 81 but the protections were limited.
The Department of Justice interpreted Nardone to apply only to
interce?tion and divulgence of communications, but not to interception
alone. Therefore, the FBI could still wiretap for domestic security
purposes; also, the Supreme Court held that the FCA did not apply to
states, and the progress of technology created other ways of
circumventing the FCA.84  Moreover, after Burger, Katz, and a
congressional investigation into organized crime in the 1960s,
Congress realized that law enforcement needed some freedom to
conduct wiretaps.
85
76 Roundy, supra note 43, at 408.
77 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1937).
78 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
79 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
80 Id. at 353. Justice Harlan proposed the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in his
concurring opinion. It is still used today. Roundy, supra note 43, at 410-11; Solove, supra
note 44, at 198. See also FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 57-58 (1997).
81 Roundy, supra note 43, at 411.
12 Id. at 408-09.
831 Id. at 408.
84 id.
" Id. at 411.
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The Wiretap Act began as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.86 Its purpose was to "prohibit, on the
pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of oral and wire
communications, except those specifically provided for in the Act,
most notably those interceptions permitted to law enforcement officers
when authorized by court order in connection with the investigation of
[certain] serious crimes.' '87  The "first line of defense" against
improper wiretapping was a rigid authorization process often referred
to as a "super-warrant." 88 To obtain a legal wiretap, a state or federal
prosecutor had to submit a request to a judge detailing the
circumstances involved, while showing that normal investigative
methods had failed or were likely to fail. " If the request was granted,
the judge could then authorize surveillance for up to thirty days.9 °
In 1986, responding to developments in technology, Congress
enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.91 Title I of the
ECPA amended the Wiretap Act.92  Previously, the definition of a
"wire communication" was "any communication . . .by the aid of
wire, cable or other like connection. 9 3 ECPA changed this to "'any
aural transfer made ...by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection.' 94 Further, the ECPA broadened the Wiretap Act to
protect "electronic communications." 95 As amended, "any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence ... by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system"
86 Id.
87 See Dorothy Higdon Murphy, Comment, United States v. Councilman and the Scope of the
Wiretap Act: Do Old Laws Cover New Technologies?, 6 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 437, 441 (2005)
(quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974)).
88 Roundy, supra note 43, at 412.
89 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2000).
90 § 2518(5). See also Roundy, supra note 43, at 412.
91 Murphy, supra note 87, at 442. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (emphasis added); S.
Rep. No. 99-541 (1986).
92 Roundy, supra note 43, at 413.
93 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1970). See also Roundy, supra note 43, at 414.
94 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. V 2005). See also Roundy, supra note 43, at 414.
95 Roundy, supra note 43, at 414.
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was protected under the act.96 Overall, Congress intended the ECPA
to give electronic communications what the Wiretap Act of 1968 gave
wire communications.
97
V. THE MODERN WIRETAP ACT
Today, the Wiretap Act 98 imposes liability on both government and
private actors for intentionally intercepting electronic
communications.99 Evoking Mark Klein's story about 641A and the
Narus STA 6400, the EFF claimed in Heptingj that AT&T intentionally
intercepted communications of its customers. 00 Section 2511 (1)(a) of
the Wiretap Act creates a general prohibition on the interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications. 10 1  Section 2511(1)(b)
applies to the interception of oral communications and is more specific
in its proscriptions than subsection (a). 102 Section 2511 (1)(b)(i) makes
it unlawful for any person to intentionally use any "electronic
mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication" 10j
when that device is affixed to, or "otherwise transmits a signal
through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire
96 Id. at 414-15. See also 100 Stat. at 1849 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)
(2000)).
97 Roundy, supra note 43, at 415.
9' Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (Supp. V 2005).
99 Richard C. Turkington, Protection for Invasions of Conversational and Communication
Privacy by Electronic Surveillance in Family, Marriage, and Domestic Disputes under
Federal and State Wiretap and Store Communications Acts and the Common Law Privacy
Intrusion Tort, 82 NEB. L. REv. 693, 704 (2004). See also Katherine A. Oyama, E-mail
Privacy After United States v. Councilman: Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 499, 504 (2006). In 2001, Congress included stored voice
communications, like voice-mail, in the definition of a "wire communication." Id. at 504;
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 1070-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (Supp. V 2005)).
100 Amended Complaint, supra note 39, at 21.
'0' 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
102 Criminal Resource Manual 1050 Scope of 18 U.S.C. 2511 Prohibitions (1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading room/usam/title9/crm01050.htm.
103 § 2511(1)(b).
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communication. ' ' 1 4 Those who violate The Wiretap Act are subject to
up to five years in prison, a fine, or both. 105
Section 2511 outlines two exceptions which allow a service
provider to legally assist the government in intercepting electronic
communications: first, when there is a court order directing the
service provider to do so;10 6 and second, where the Attorney General
has provided a certification of legality.1
0 7
Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) makes service providers liable under 18
U.S.C. § 2520 for the improper disclosure of electronic
communications. 18 Under § 2520, an electronic communications
service provider may be required to pay the "actual damages suffered
by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the
violation," 0 9or $10,000 for each day of the violation. 10  Also,
preliminary or equitable relief, punitive damages, and reasonable
attorney's fees are available.111
In Hepting, the EFF claimed that AT&T's program violated
§ 2511(3)(a). This section prohibits an electronic communication
service provider from divulging the contents of real-time
communications to anyone other than the addressee or intended
recipient of the communications. 113  Since the NSA did not have a
court order, a warrant, or authorization from the AG, the EFF claimed
that AT&T improperly gave the agency access to the communication
contents of its customers.' 4  Not only does Klein's information
104 § 2511 (1)(b)(i).
'05 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (2000). See also Peter P. Swire, Legal FAQs on NSA Wiretaps,
http://www.peterswire.net/nsa_ fullfaq.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
106 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2000). See also Swire & Legum, supra note 60.
107 § 2511 (2)(a)(ii)(B). See also Swire & Legum, supra note 60.
'o' § 2511(2)(a)(ii).
109 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(A) (2000).
110 § 2520(c)(2)(B).
.. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(1)-(3) (2000).
1 12 Amended Complaint, supra note 39, at 21.
113 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (2000).
1 14 Amended Complaint, supra note 39, at 20.
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corroborate what the EFF already claimed, but it could add further
liability. If accurate, AT&T could be liable under § 2511(1)(b)(i),
because the splitter device Klein described appears to violate the
statute's prohibition on connecting such a device to a line used for
wire communications. 115
VI. THE PEN REGISTER STATUTE
In %eVting, the EFF alleged AT&T violated the Pen Register
Statute." Like the Wiretap Act, the Pen Register Statute of the ECPA
applies to real-time communications. 117 However, whereas the former
predominantly covers in-transit content information the latter only
applies to non-content electronic communications8 Because the
NSA/AT&T data collection program seems to be directed at collecting
CDRs, it implicates this section of the ECPA as well.
A pen register is a tool that records the numbers of outgoing calls
dialed from a telephone; its companion, a trap and trace device, works
in the reverse, recording numbers of incoming calls." 9  Before the
ECPA, the public was not protected from either of these devices. The
Supreme Court first dealt with pen registers and trap and trace devices
in United States v. New York Telephone Company. The Court held
that these tools were not governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, thus the protections of the
Wiretap Act did not extend to them.121 Given that pen registers and
trap and trace devices do not collect the contents of communications,
115 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 523 (2001) (Section 2511(1)(b) applies "to the
intentional use of devices designed to intercept oral conversations."). See also Crowley v.
CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (refusing to find a claim
under the Wiretap Act because there was no device used to collect information).
116 Amended Complaint, supra note 39, at 26.
117 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1557, 1565 (2004).
118 See id. at 1566.
119 See Robert Ditzion, Note, Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age: The Strange Case of
Pen Registers, 41 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 1321, 1322 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 3127.
120 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
121 Id. at 167. See also Ditzion, supra note 119, at 1326.
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but only numbers that are dialed, they do not fall within the ambit of
the Wiretap Act. 
122
Notably, the decision in New York Telephone did not concern any
Fourth Amendment implications of pen registers. 123 However, two
years later, the Supreme Court dealt with precisely that issue in Smith
v. Maryland.'2 4 In that case, police in Baltimore used a pen register to
find an alleged stalker without obtaining a warrant.1 25 The petitioner
claimed the evidence used against him should not be admitted because
it constituted an illegal search and seizure. 126 Nevertheless, the Court
held the Fourth Amendment did not cover the type of information
collected by a pen register, and that telephone customers do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.
127
"Petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in
the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he
dialed.",12
8
Because of these two judicial decisions, Congress included
protections against pen register and trap and trace device surveillance
in the ECPA.'r29 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3121 provides a general prohibition
on the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices without a prior
court order. 130 When a government agency is authorized to use such a
device, it may only decipher the numbers dialed and not record the
contents of the communication.'31
122 434 U.S. at 167.
123 Ditzion, supra note 119, at 1327.
124 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
12 Id. at 737.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 742.
128 Id. at 744.
129 Ditzion, supra note 119, at 1328.
"3 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (Supp. V 2005).
131 § 3121(c).
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To obtain authorization to use a pen register or trap and trace
device a law enforcement official must request an order from a
court.132 The request must contain the identities of the target and
whose phone is being tapped (if known), the location of the device,
and "a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be
obtained" relates. 133  After the order is made, and when the
information that is "likely to be obtained by such installation and use is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation," a court shall (not may)
grant the use of the device. 134 Then, the court can compel a teleco to
assist law enforcement officials with installation of the pen register or
trap and trace device when necessary. 13  A number-collecting device
may be used without a court order in an emergency situation involving
the immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm, organized
crime, a threat to national security, or an attack on a protected
computer.1 3 6 In such a situation, an order approving the device must
be obtained within forty-eight hours of the device's use.13 7 If someone
unlawfully uses a pen register or a trap and trace device, he or she
"shall be fined ...or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both. 13
8
VII. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
It was not long before the United States government intervened in
Hepting v. AT&T and invoked the state secrets privilege, in an attempt
to dismiss the case quickly and without sensitive information
becoming public.' 39  The state secrets privilege originated in the
132 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-23 (Supp. V 2005). See also, Ditzion, supra note 119, at 1329.
113 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
134 § 3123(a)(2).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 3124 (Supp. V 2005).
136 18 U.S.C. § 3125 (Supp. V 2005).
137 Id.
131 18 U.S.C. § 3121(d) (Supp. V 2005).
139 First Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp.
2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), 1, available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/
USAstatement of interest.pdf [hereinafter First Statement of Interest].
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common law during the early years of the United States, 14 0 and was
used in court as early as 1807 in United States v. Burr.141 In that case,
Aaron Burr had been charged with treason and attempting to raise a
rebellion. 142 President Jefferson refused to produce a document that
was important to Burr's defense because turning it over would have
been harmful to national security.143 Ultimately, the Court decided the
case without ruling on the state secrets issue, but implied in dictum
that a certain degree of privilege belonged to the executive in
disclosing sensitive information. 144
The Supreme Court addressed the state secrets privilege more
directly in Totten v. United States.145 In that case, the plaintiff sought
compensation for services rendered on a contract he had with President
Lincoln to spy on the Confederate Army.146  "The Court held that
where the contract in issue is one to perform 'secret services,' the case
must be dismissed, as it will inevitably result in the disclosure of
confidential information.' ', 47  Since the contract was a confidential
matter, the action brought to enforce it had to be dismissed.
48
Confidential information would necessarily be disclosed in conducting
the case and thus the action was not allowed to proceed.
149
140 Anthony Rapa, Comment, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department of
Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 233, 237
(2006).
141 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (C.C.D. Va. 1807); see Erin M. Stilp, Comment,
The Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REv.
831, 833 (2006).
142 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37; see John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v.
Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1435, 1436 (1999).
143 Stilp, supra note 141, at 833.
144 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37; Stilp, supra note 141, at 833-34.
145 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
146 Rapa, supra note 140, at 241.
147 Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
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Nearly eighty years later, the Supreme Court developed guidelines
for invoking the privilege in United States v. Reynolds.r0 During Air
Force testing of electronic equipment on B-29 bombers, a plane
crashed killing six crew members and three civilians.' 5 During
discovery, the plaintiffs moved for production of an accident report the
Air Force created regarding the crash.1 52 The government argued that
the report was privileged information and should not be disclosed, but
this argument was rejected by both the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.' 53 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decisions
of the lower courts and found that a special privilege exists for some
military and state secrets.' 
54
Even though a state secrets privilege exists, "it is not to be lightly
invoked.' '155 To do so, a head of a department must formally claim the
privilege and a court must determine if the claim is appropriate.
Further, the court must decide if the privilege can be used "without
forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect."'156 Thus, the Court in Reynolds decided the state secrets
privilege belonged to the government, must affirmatively be claimed
by a department head, and must pass the scrutiny of a judge before it is
properly invoked; the privilege cannot be claimed by a private party.'
5 7
"Courts have taken an expansive view of what constitutes a state
secret" when applying Totten and Reynolds. 5 8 They have often
deferred to the executive branch when the privilege has been invoked,
citing a lack of expertise in the area. 159 Unfortunately, using the state
150 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
151 Id. at 3; Holly L. McPherson, Tenet v. Doe: Balancing National Security and Contracts to
Spy, 28 U. HAw. L. REv. 201, 217 (2005).
12 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 6.
155 Id. at 7.
15 6 Id. at 8.
157 Id.
5 Rapa, supra note 140, at 244.
159 Id.
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secrets privilege normally leads to several undesirable consequences.
First, if the plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case without the
privileged information, it will be dismissed.1 60 Second, the case may
also be dismissed "if the government is unable to defend itself without
using the classified" information. 161  Third, if the government is
prosecuting the case and the privilege deprives the defendant of
evidence necessary to his or her defense, there will be a summary
judgment for the defendant. 162 Finally, the court may dismiss the case
if the subject matter itself is a state secret. 163
In Hepting v. AT&T, the United States government filed a
statement of interest with the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, stating
it intended to invoke the state secrets privilege. 164 The statement said
"when allegations are made about purported classified government
activities or relationships, regardless of whether those allegations are
accurate, the existence or non-existence of the activity or relationship
is potentially a state secret," thus claiming the very essence of the case
is a state secret and the case should be dismissed. 65 In the statement,
the government cited Reynolds, Totten, and Burr as authorities, noting
that protecting state secrets often requires dismissal. 66  The
government claimed that this case should not continue because it
would necessarily 67disclose information that would be harmful to
national security. If the case verified that a NSA/AT&T data-
collection program existed, a terrorist could easily switch to a different
telephone carrier and avoid inspection.' 68 At the same time, if the case
revealed that the program did not exist, then more terrorists may start
160 Stilp, supra note 141, at 837.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 837.
163 Id. See also Rapa, supra note 140, at 250.
164 "The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the
Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the
United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to
attend to any other interest of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 517 (West 2008).
165 First Statement of Interest, supra note 139, at 1.
166 Id. at i.
.
67 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
118 Id. at 990.
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communicating via AT&T. 169 Shortly after issuing this statement of
interest, the government did, in fact, file a motion to dismiss based on
the state secrets privilege. 1
70
When considering this issue, the Hepting court first looked to see if
the information the government wanted to protect was actually a state
secret. The court chose to consider only "publicly reported
information that possesses substantial indicia of reliability and whose
verification or substantiation possesses the potential to endanger
national security."'171 It did not rely on Mr. Klein's statement or media
reports, but instead considered only what the government had admitted
or denied. 1
72
The Hepting Court found that, unlike the secret spy program in
Totten, the government had already admitted a terrorist surveillance
program existed, albeit a legal one. 173 In his weekly radio address,
President Bush confirmed the existence of the "terrorist surveillance
program" that was first revealed by The New York Times.
In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation [on
Sept 11, 2001], I authorized the National Security Agency,
consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept
the international communications of people with known
links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. 74
Two days later, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales further
verified its existence when he stated that the president had authorized a
program to intercept communications where one party to the
communication is outside of the United States.' 75 Moreover, while
161 Id. at 990.
170 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by
the United States of America, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(No. C 06-0672-VRW), available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/GovMotiontoDismiss.pdf.
171 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
171 Id. at 990-91.
171 Id. at 991-92.
174 Press Release, President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html.
175 Press Release, Att'y Gen. Alberto Gonzales, supra note 33.
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BellSouth, Verizon, and Qwest have denied association with the NSA
program, AT&T has not. 176  Thus, "the public denials by these
telecommunications companies undercut the government and AT&T's
contention that revealing AT&T's involvement or lack thereof in the
program would disclose a state secret." 177 Accordingly, the Hepting
Court denied the government's motion to dismiss the case based on the
state secrets privilege. 178  Still, it only required discovery of
information at AT&T that was of the same level of generality as the
government's disclosures.
179
Nevertheless, the district court was reluctant to entirely rule out the
state secrets privilege. It held that AT&T did not need to reveal the
details of its relationship with the NSA because it might qualify as a
protectable state secret that should be protected. 8 ° Still, the court
noted that in the future, the government might reveal more information
about the NSA profram that would make disclosure by AT&T no
longer a state secret. 1 If so, AT&T may be required to disclose more
information about its involvement in the program at that time.
182
Thus, the court left the door open for the issue to be revisited in the
future. 183
VIII. THE HEPTING APPEAL
After the first attempt to have the lawsuit dismissed, AT&T took
the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
176 Marguerite Reardon, Telecoms Deny Illegally Handing Over Call Records, ZDNET NEWS,
May 17, 2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-6073179.html; John O'Neil & Eric
Lichtenblau, Qwest's Refusal ofN.S.A. Query is Explained, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/washington/12cnd-phone.html?ex- 305086400&en=
16b1 c1 d5l2dldO4b&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc-rss.
177 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d. at 997.
118 Id. at 998.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 997.
181 Id.
112 Id. at 998.
183 Id.
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("Ninth Circuit"). 184 The appeal was granted on November 7 2006; as
of the writing of this article, the Court has not made a ruling.SW
AT&T argued that the plaintiffs could not establish standing and
therefore the case must be dismissed. 8 6 As in Reynolds,18 7 AT&T
could not itself claim the state secrets privilege because it is a private
entity and not a government actor. However, the government asserted
the privilege and the court below acknowledged that it could be at least
partially applicable in this case. 188 In its appeal, AT&T argued that the
plaintiffs cannot establish that they were actually spied upon.
189
"When a plaintiff claims injury arising out of government surveillance
... standing exists only when the plaintiff can furnish 'proof of actual
acquisition of [his] communications.'" 90 The lawsuit cannot proceed
without this "actual acquisition." What is more, Mark Klein's story
does not help to establish standing because its validity cannot be
litigated without running afoul of the state secrets privilege. 1
9
'
AT&T further argued for dismissal of the case because the
invocation of the state secrets privilege prevents full and fair litigation
of the case. 192 Recall that in Totten v. United States, the Supreme
Court dismissed a case because litigating a overnment surveillance
contract would necessarily reveal state secrets. 9 As in Totten, AT&T
argued that this case should be dismissed because it necessarily would
184 Petition for Permission to Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,
439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/Petition.pdf [hereinafter Petition].
185 Order Granting Appeal to Ninth Circuit, Hepting v. AT&T Corp. available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/appealgranted.pdf.
186 Petition, supra note 184, at 9.
187 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
118 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
189 Petition, supra note 184, at 15-16.
190 Brief of Appellant AT&T Corp. at 24, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (No. 06-17132), available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/
attopening brief.pdf (citing Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
"' Id. at 49.
1'2Id. at 31.
'9' See Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
[Vol. 3:3
reveal specifics of the program that are properly privileged. 194 AT&T
also claimed that the court below erred by assuming that the company
had participated in an illegal surveillance program without actual
proof.1
95
Since the case is currently ongoing, it is premature to speculate
exactly how it will be decided. As aforementioned, courts often take
an expansive view of the state secrets privilege and defer when the
government invokes it. 196 However, the district court here has broken
from that trend and decided that litigation should go forward.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has been "skeptical of and sometimes
hostile" to the government's argument. 197  Still, it is unclear exactly
how this case will be resolved. Nevertheless, the consequences are
severe: AT&T could be liable for large sums of money and a huge
government data-collection program could be exposed.
IX. THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007
Until recently, Congress was unable to agree on any legislation to
deal with the surveillance and national security issues raised by
Hepting. The Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act came close,
making its way through the House of Representatives in September
2006, i" 8 only to die in the Senate without ever reaching a vote.
194 Petition, supra note 184, at 37.
195 Id. at 40.
196 Rapa, supra note 140, at 249.
197 Adam Liptak, U.S. Defends Surveillance Before 3 Skeptical Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2007, at A13.
198 Anne Broache, House Votes to Expand Electronic Spying Powers, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept.
29, 2006, http://news.com.comi/House+votes+to+expand+electronic+spying+powers/2100-
1028_3-6121474.html.
'99 H.R. 5825 109th (2006): Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act (GovTrack.us),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5825#votes (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
For more information on the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, see Elizabeth Bazan,
CRS Report for Congress: H.R. 5825 109th (2006): "Electronic Surveillance Modernization
Act," available at http://www.fas.org/sgpcrs/intel/RL33637.pdf; Opposition to H.R. 5835, the
Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.cdt.org/
security/20060928wilsonletter.pdf.
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Then on August 5, 2007, under strong pressure from the White
House 20 Congress passed the Protect America Act ("PAA") of
2007 .2b Introduced by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) a mere four
days earlier, this law passed through both houses with only a single
amendment.2 °2  Despite the short deliberation, this bill made
significant changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA")20 3 and has serious implications for future lawsuits similar to
Hepting.
The PAA's purpose was to modernize the law with regard to
developments in technology that occurred since FISA was passed in
1978. At the time FISA was passed, most international
communications were conducted through wireless communications
and domestic communications were primarily transmitted via wire.20 5
Today, however, the situation has reversed and international
communications once transmitted by satellite now use fiber optics.
206
Before the PAA, FISA excluded satellite communications from its
regulations, but included fiber optic communications. 207  Thus, as
originally conceived, FISA would have excluded most international
communications from its scope, allowing foreign intelligence to be
collected more easily, while regulating domestic communications and
200 Radio Address, President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address, July 28, 2007,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070728.htrnl; Eric
Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Broader Spying Authority Advances in Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2007, at A8; Carl Hulse & Edmund L. Andrews, House Approves Changes in
Eavesdropping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at Al.
201 Protect America Act, Public Law No 110-055, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 10_congApublic-laws&docid=
f:publ055.110.pdf.
202 The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 10:SN01927:@@@R
(last visited, Jan. 23, 2008).
203 FISA is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-62.
204 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Protect America Act of
2007, Statement for the Record of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence,
Sept 20, 2007 available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070920testimony.pdf
[hereinafter Hearing].
205 Id. at 5.
206 Id.
2 71Id. at 5-6.
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protecting people in the United States. However, because of the use of
transnational fiber optics today, many communications that could be
vital to foreign intelligence fell under the regulation of pre-PAA
FISA.2 °s
The PAA addressed this problem in its first amendment to FISA.
Section 105A redefined "electronic surveillance" by removing from
FISA's scope all "surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed
to be located outside of the United States."209 Since FISA regulates
"electronic surveillance," this chanje in definition eliminates such
surveillance from FISA's regulation. Now, "if the government is
monitoring someone outside the United States from a telecom switch
in the U.S., it can listen in on the person's calls and read their e-mails
without obtaining a FISA warrant first."
2 1 1
The Director of National Intelligence ("DNI"), Michael
McConnell, has called section 105A "the head of this legislation."
212
Prior to the PAA, the intelligence community was wasting time
obtaining warrants for targets located outside of the United States.213
"This process had little to do with protecting the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans. These were foreign intelligence targets, located
in foreign countries." 214 Thus, according to the DNI, the PAA was
necessary to address the realities of today's foreign intelligence
gathering.
215
Section 105B(a) of the PAA empowers the DNI and the AG to
authorize surveillance for up to one year on persons reasonably
believed to be outside of the United States.216 However, before such
208 Id. at6.
209 Protect America Act of 2007 § 105A, Pub. Law. No. 110-055 (Aug. 5, 2007).
210 EPIC, http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
211 Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/posts/l186332672.shtml (Aug. 5, 2007, 13:51 EST).
212 Hearing, supra note 204.
213 Id. at 9.
2141id.
215 Id. at 3.
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power can be executed, the DNI and the AG must certify in writing
that there are procedures in place to determine that the surveillance
concerns persons reasonably believed to be outside of the U.S.; it is
not electronic surveillance (under its new definition); it involves
obtaining information with the assistance of a communications service
provider; a "significant purpose" of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence; and there are minimization procedures in place to
prevent information from being gathered about a person within the
U.S. 217 If time does not permit a written certification, the DNI and the
AG can authorize surveillance for up to 72 hours before a written
certification is required.218 When complete, the written certification
must be sent to the FISA court and will remain sealed unless it is
needed to assess the legality of the surveillance.2 19
The part of the Protect America Act that is likely most critical for
telecos is the power of the AG and the DNI to compel telecos to turn
over information seen as helpful to foreign intelligence. 220  If the
teleco fails to cooperate, the AG may bring the company before the
FISA court to force compliance. 221 "Failure to obey an order of the
court may be punished" as contempt of court.222 However, a teleco
can challenge a surveillance directive in the FISA court, with the judge
holding power to modify or set aside the directive if necessary.223
These new amendments also have serious implications for future
lawsuits like Hepting. Section 105B(l) bars any cause of action
against "any person for providing any information, facilities, or
assistance in accordance with a directive under this section." 224 Thus,
a case against a teleco could never be brought against surveillance
done pursuant to FISA.
To prevent abuses, the PAA contains additional checks on this
expanded surveillance power, but these checks are minimal. Section
217 § 105B(a)(1)-(5).
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220 § 105B(e)
221 § 105B(g).
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105C requires the AG to submit to the FISA court the procedures used
by the government to confirm that intelligence will not constitute
electronic surveillance within 120 days of when the law became
active.225  In these situations, the court will only overrule the
government if it finds the order "clearly erroneous."2  Furthermore,
the AG must inform the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives, and the Judiciary Committees of both houses
concerning acquisitions of foreign intelligence during the previous six
months.22  In this report to the Committees, the AG must describe any
incidences of non-compliance by a teleco. 228  Interestingly, and
perhaps paradoxically, the AG must also self-report any incidence
during the prior six months during which the government did not
ensure that surveillance was directed toward someone reasonably
believed to be outside of the U.S.
22 9
Not surprisingly, the PAA has spurred much debate from all sides
of the political spectrum.230 The day after the PAA passed, the White
House released a "fact sheet" supporting the Act's amendments.23 1
The PAA is important to the White House because it brings FISA in
line with technological advances and allows foreign intelligence to be
collected more effectively and efficiently.232 Orin Kerr,233 an Internet
surveillance law expert, and Philip Bobbitt,234 a constitutional law
225 Protect America Act § 105C(a).
226 Id. § 105C(c).
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scholar, also agree with the legislation. Kerr has stated that the
"legislation on the whole seems relatively well done."235 He noted that
giving the government access to the communications of people outside
236the U.S., even if it forces telecos to cooperate, seems appropriate.
Bobbitt notes that "all sides agree that some legislative fix" to
surveillance laws was needed "because of changes in
telecommunications technology. '" 237  He writes that "in Robert M.
Gates, the defense secretary, Mike McConnell, the director of national
intelligence, and Gen[eral] Michael V. Hayden, the director of central
intelligence, we have about as good a team as it is possible to imagine.
Most people in Congress know that. Why not assume they are
proposing a solution to a real problem?,
238
The ACLU released its own "fact sheet" in response to the White
House's version.239 Calling the FISA amendment the "Police America
Act," the ACLU argued the Act "allows for massive, untargeted
collection of international communications without a court order or
meaningful oversight by either Congress or the courts."24 The ACLU
doubts the protections that are built into the new law.241 "The report to
the court only need detail how the program is directed at people
reasonably believed to be overseas-it does not require the AG to
explain how it treats Americans' calls or emails when they are
intercepted., 242 Yale Professor Jack Balkan has further criticized the
FISA amendments, fearing that the United States is slowly moving
toward becoming a surveillance state where the government is freed
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from political control and accountabilit 243  Even the conservative
John Birch Society does not trust the law.
X. CONCLUSION
Perhaps something that all sides can agree on is that the debate is
far from over. Indeed, one amendment made to the PAA was a sunset
provision which stated that changes to FISA would only last six
months. 245 While there is some question how effective this provision
will be,246 it is nevertheless clear that something more permanent is
needed. As the White House pushes to make the PAA's changes
247permanent, a presidential election looms, and Hepting is still being
litigated. The only certainty is that issues related to the ECPA, the
Stored Communications Act, and the Pen Register Statute will remain
vitally important and widely debated.
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